Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/284747 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] The RAND Journal of Economics [ISSN:] 1756-2171 [Volume:] 52 [Issue:] 4 [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 859-883
Verlag: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze a competitive labor market in which workers signal their productivities through education, and firms have the option of auditing to learn workers' productivities. Audits are costly and non‐contractible. We characterize the trade‐offs between signaling by workers and costly auditing by firms. Auditing is always associated with (partial) pooling of worker types, and education is used as a signal only if relatively few workers have low productivity. Our results feature new auditing patterns and explain empirical observations in labor economics like wage differentials and comparative statics of education choices. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, for example, the financial structure of firms, warranties, and initial public offerings.
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