Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/284744 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Scottish Journal of Political Economy [ISSN:] 1467-9485 [Volume:] 68 [Issue:] 5 [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 605-622
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
In this paper, football clubs are modeled as value‐maximizing enterprises. With a long‐term perspective in this framework, players are not only factors of production, but also assets of the club. It is shown that talent investment is higher with value‐maximization than with profit maximization for homogeneous football clubs. Club heterogeneity is then modeled by different time‐horizons regarding future profits, which leads to asymmetric levels of talent investment. Teams with longer time‐horizons demand more talent and tilt the competition to their favor. Increases in transfer prices for players worsen the competitive balance, while higher player wages improve it.
Subjects: 
football
players as assets
Tobin's q
value‐maximization
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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