Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/284409 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik No. 24/1
Publisher: 
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Institut für Allgemeine Wirtschaftsforschung, Abteilung für Wirtschaftspolitik und Ordnungsökonomik, Freiburg i. Br.
Abstract: 
Collusive agreements in the form of cartels among firms are complex structures. The involved firms need to agree on prices and sales quotas that are legally not enforceable. Market characteristics that foster cartels' failure or success are widely examined. However, the interplay between the involved firms in a collusive agreement, i.e., the governance dimension within a cartel, has received surprisingly low attention. Using a comprehensive dataset of 191 cartels from 2012 - 2018, this paper empirically reveals that polycentric structures within the cartel governance may contribute to longer duration and lower sanctions imposed by competition authorities, especially for large cartels. By that, the paper sheds new light on two aspects: The entangled governance structures of collusive undertakings as well as the relevance of polycentricity in the firm environment. The insights may be helpful for cartel authorities and new research combining institutional and industrial economics.
Subjects: 
Collusion
illegal cartels
polycentricity
governance
institutions
JEL: 
A14
D02
D23
K42
L40
O17
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
685.15 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.