Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/284299 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 949
Verlag: 
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance, London
Zusammenfassung: 
We study identification of preferences in static single-agent discrete choice models where decision makers may be imperfectly informed about the state of the world. We leverage the notion of one-player Bayes Correlated Equilibrium by Bergemann and Morris (2016) to provide a tractable characterization of the sharp identified set. We develop a procedure to practically construct the sharp identified set when the state of the world is continuous following a sieve approach, and provide sharp bounds on counterfactual outcomes of interest. We use our methodology and data on the 2017 UK general election to estimate a spatial voting model under weak assumptions on agents' information about the returns to voting. Counterfactual exercises quantify the consequences of imperfect information on the well-being of voters and parties.
Schlagwörter: 
Discrete choice model
Bayesian Persuasion
Bayes Correlated Equilibrium
Incomplete Information
Partial Identification
Moment Inequalities
Spatial Model of Voting
JEL: 
C01
C25
D72
D80
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
902.81 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.