Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/284061 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. WP 2023-20
Verlag: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, we revisit the scope for macroprudential policy in production economies with pecuniary externalities and collateral constraints. We study competitive equilibria and constrained-efficient equilibria and examine the extent to which the gap between the two depends on the production structure and the policy instruments available to the planner. We argue that macroprudential policy is desirable regardless of whether the competitive equilibrium features more or less borrowing than the constrained-efficient equilibrium. In our quantitative analysis, macroprudential taxes on borrowing turn out to be larger when the government has access to ex-post stabilization policies.
Schlagwörter: 
Macroprudential policy
over-borrowing
under-borrowing
JEL: 
E58
F31
F32
F34
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
547 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.