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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
AWI Discussion Paper Series No. 733
Verlag: 
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Two partners try to dissolve a partnership that owns an asset of ambiguous value, where the value is determined ex post by a draw from an Ellsberg urn. In a within-subject experiment, subjects make decisions in three different bargaining mechanisms: unstructured bargaining, the Texas shoot-out, and a K + 1 auction. We find that the K +1 auction is the most effcient mechanism, which is in line with theory. Free format bargaining yields a surprising number of disagreements, which are not usually observed when the partnership has a certain or risky value.
Schlagwörter: 
Bargaining
ambiguity
experiment
JEL: 
C91
C72
D74
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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