Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282870 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2023-057/VIII
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
Without regulation or agreement, public goods are underprovided and public bads are overprovided. Both problems are usually seen as flip sides of the same coin. In this paper we examine a situation where a public good is good for some agents but bad for others, and this preference is endogenous to the provisioning level of the good. We allow agents to form a coalition to coordinate provision. Compared with games with only goods (or only bads) we find larger coalitions in equilibrium. Specifically, we analyze a game with quadratic benefit- and cost functions and we find the grand coalition to be stable except for situations where agents have identical or almost identical characteristics. The main driving force of coalition stability is that cooperation avoids a wasteful contest between agents pulling the provision level in opposite directions. We show that, in equilibrium, wasteful contest is confined to a narrow range of the parameter space of our game. This result connects the literatures on public goods and contests.
Schlagwörter: 
Public goods or bads
Cartel games
Coalition stability
Contests
Geoengineering
JEL: 
C72
D02
Q20
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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