Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282163 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 472
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Abstract: 
We study whether one reason behind female underrepresentation in leadership is that female leaders are less effective at coordinating followers' actions. Two experiments using coordination games investigate whether female leaders are less successful than males in persuading followers to coordinate on efficient equilibria. In these settings, successful coordination hinges on higher-order beliefs about the leader's capacity to convince followers to pursue desired actions, making beliefs that women are less effective leaders potentially self-confirming. We find no evidence that such bias impacts actual leadership performance, precisely estimating the absence of a gender leadership gap. We further show that this result is surprising given experts' priors.
Subjects: 
gender
coordination games
leadership
experiment
JEL: 
D23
C72
C92
J1
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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