Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282151 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 460
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our treatments include markets with (a) complete cost symmetry and complete information, (b) slight cost asymmetry and complete information, and (c) varying cost asymmetries and incomplete information. For the case of complete cost symmetry and complete information, our data confirm the well-known result that duopoly players achieve, on average, partial collusion. However, as soon as any level of cost asymmetry or incomplete information is introduced, observed average individual quantities are remarkably close to the static Bayes-Nash equilibrium predictions.
Schlagwörter: 
Cournot
Bayesian game
Bayes-Nash equilibrium
repeated games
collusion
cooperation
experimental economics
JEL: 
D43
L13
C72
C92
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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