Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282133 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 442
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Abstract: 
We investigate fairness preferences in matching mechanisms using a spectator design. Participants choose between the Boston mechanism or the serial dictatorship mechanism (SD) played by others. In our setup, the Boston mechanism generates justified envy, while the strategy-proof SD ensures envy-freeness. When priorities are merit-based, many spectators prefer the Boston mechanism, and this preference increases when priorities are determined by luck. At the same time, there is support for SD, but mainly when priorities are merit-based. Stated voting motives indicate that choosing SD is driven by concerns for envy-freeness rather than strategy-proofness, while support for the Boston mechanism stems from the belief that strategic choices create entitlements.
Subjects: 
matching markets
school choice
voting
Boston mechanism
sincere agents
justified envy
JEL: 
D47
C92
I24
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
688.54 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.