Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282101 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 409
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Promise competition is prevalent in many economic environments, but promise keeping is often difficult to observe. We study the value of transparency for promise competition and ask whether promises still offer an opportunity to honor future obligations when outcomes do not allow for observing promise keeping. Focusing on campaign promises, we show theoretically how preferences for truth-telling shape promise competition when promise keeping can(not) be observed and identify the causal effects of transparency in an incentivized experiment. Transparency leads to less promise breaking but also to less generous promises. Rent appropriations are higher in opaque institutions though only weakly so when not fully opaque. Instrumental reputational concerns and preferences for truth-telling explain these results.
Schlagwörter: 
campaign promises
promise breaking
voting
lying costs
preferences for truth-telling
political Economy
theory
experiment
JEL: 
C91
C92
D72
D73
D91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
556.11 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.