Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282092 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 400
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Abstract: 
We provide evidence on how responsibility-shifting through delegation occurred in China's implementation of the one-child policy. We show that trust in local governments was reduced when they were the primary enforcer of the policy (1979–1990), while trust in neighbors was reduced when civilians were incentivized to report neighbors' violations of the policy to the authorities (1991–2015). This effect was more pronounced among parents of a firstborn daughter, who were more likely to violate the policy due to the deep-rooted son preference. This study provides the first set of field evidence on the responsibility-shifting effect of delegation.
Subjects: 
delegation
responsibility-shifting
One-Child policy
JEL: 
D02
D04
D90
J18
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
354.59 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.