Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282033 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 341
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the effects of the 1984 breakup of the Bell System on the rate, diversity, and direction of US innovation. In the antitrust case leading to the breakup, AT&T, the holding company of the Bell System, was accused of using exclusionary practices against competitors. The breakup was intended to end these practices. After the breakup, the scale and diversity of telecommunications innovation increased. Total patenting by US inventors related to telecommunications increased by 19%, driven by companies unrelated to the Bell System. Patenting by Bell's successor companies decreased, but not the number of top inventions.
Schlagwörter: 
antitrust
innovation
diversity
exclusionary practices
JEL: 
O30
K21
L40
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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