Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/28120 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series in Economics No. 26
Publisher: 
Universität Lüneburg, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Lüneburg
Abstract: 
We analyze within a dynamic model how firms decide on capital investment if the accompanying adjustment costs are a function of governmental activity. The government provides a public input and decides on the degree of rivalry. The productive public input enhances private capital productivity and reduces adjustment costs. We derive the equilibrium in which capital and investment ratio are both constant, carry out comparative dynamic analysis and discuss the model's policy implications.
JEL: 
D21
H40
H54
O16
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
259.49 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.