Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/281127 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 020.2023
Publisher: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Abstract: 
For two periods an expert E announces his forecast of the state to a decision-maker D who chooses action. They disagree about the precision of the probability assessments. At the end of period 1 the state is observed. In the last period E makes announcements more extreme than his forecasts. Despite countable equilibria, full revelation is never realised. When in period 1 E is interested in reputation only, the initial equilibrium partition is finite; E makes announcements of greater uncertainty with respect to his forecasts. When E is interested in action too, reputational concerns mitigate exaggerated reports.
Subjects: 
cheap-talk
expert
statistical bias
JEL: 
D81
D84
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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