Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28105
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dc.contributor.authorGersbach, Hansen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-01T14:50:33Z-
dc.date.available2009-10-01T14:50:33Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.citation|aEconomics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal |v3 |h2009-35 |p1-40en_US
dc.identifier.pidoi:10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2009-35-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/28105-
dc.description.abstractThe author proposes a two-round process called minority voting to allocate public projects in a polity. In the first round, a society decides by a simple majority decision whether to provide the public project. If the proposal in the first round is rejected, the process ends. Otherwise the process continues, but only the members of the minority keep agenda and voting rights for the second round, in which the financing scheme is determined. In the second round, the unanimity rule or the simple majority rule is applied. The author provides a first pass of relative welfare comparisons between minority voting and simple majority voting and outline the research program.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKielen_US
dc.subject.jelD60en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelH40en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordDemocratic constitutionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordminority votingen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic projectsen_US
dc.titleMinority voting and public project provisionen_US
dc.type|aArticleen_US
dc.identifier.ppn609707043en_US
dc.rights.licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifweej:200935-

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