Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/28103 
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dc.contributor.authorCorneo, Giacomoen
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-18-
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-25T13:29:11Z-
dc.date.available2009-09-25T13:29:11Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/28103-
dc.description.abstractSince objective news coverage is vital to democracy, captured media can seriously distort collective decisions. The current paper develops a voting model where citizens are uncertain about the welfare eþects induced by alternative policy options and derive information about those eþects from the mass media. The media might however secretly collude with interest groups in order to in.uence the public opinion. In the case of voting over the level of a productivity-enhancing public bad, it is shown that an increase in the concentration of firm ownership makes the occurrence of media bias more likely. Although media bias is not always welfare worsening, conditions for it to raise welfare are restrictive.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFreie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionsbeiträge |x2005/1en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordMass Mediaen
dc.subject.keywordPublic Badsen
dc.subject.keywordVotingen
dc.subject.keywordWealth Inequalityen
dc.titleMedia capture in a democracy: the role of wealth concentration-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn609073281en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fubsbe:20051en

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