Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/28096 
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dc.contributor.authorBester, Helmuten
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-15-
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-25T13:29:06Z-
dc.date.available2009-09-25T13:29:06Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-941240-01-8en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/28096-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies investment incentives in the steady state of a dynamic bilateral matching market. Because of search frictions, both parties in a match are partially locked-in when they bargain over the joint surplus from their sunk investments. The associated holdup problem depends on market conditions and is more important for the long side of the market. In the case of investments in homogenous capital only the agents on the short side acquire ownership of capital. There is always underinvestment on both sides of the market. But when market frictions become negligible, the equilibrium investment levels tend towards the first-best.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFreie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionsbeiträge |x2009/7en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelD23en
dc.subject.jelD92en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordHoldup Problemen
dc.subject.keywordMatching Marketen
dc.subject.keywordInvestmentsen
dc.titleInvestments and the holdup problem in a matching market-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn608747769en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fubsbe:20097en

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