Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28096
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dc.contributor.authorBester, Helmuten_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-15en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-25T13:29:06Z-
dc.date.available2009-09-25T13:29:06Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-941240-01-8en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/28096-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies investment incentives in the steady state of a dynamic bilateral matching market. Because of search frictions, both parties in a match are partially locked-in when they bargain over the joint surplus from their sunk investments. The associated holdup problem depends on market conditions and is more important for the long side of the market. In the case of investments in homogenous capital only the agents on the short side acquire ownership of capital. There is always underinvestment on both sides of the market. But when market frictions become negligible, the equilibrium investment levels tend towards the first-best.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aFreie Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss.|cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSchool of Business & Economics Discussion Paper|x2009/7en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.jelD92en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordHoldup Problemen_US
dc.subject.keywordMatching Marketen_US
dc.subject.keywordInvestmentsen_US
dc.titleInvestments and the holdup problem in a matching marketen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn608747769en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fubsbe:20097-

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