Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/28087 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge No. 2008/23
Verlag: 
Freie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes bilateral contracting in an environment with contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. One party (the seller) makes an unverifiable quality choice and the other party (the buyer) has private information about its valuation. A simple exit option contract, which allows the buyer to refuse trade, achieves the firstbest in the benchmark cases where either quality is verifiable or the buyer's valuation is public information. But, when unverifiable and asymmetric information are combined, exit options induce inefficient pooling and lead to a particularly simple contract. Inefficient pooling is unavoidable also under the most general form of contracts, which make trade conditional on the exchange of messages between the parties. Indeed, simple exit option contracts are optimal if random mechanisms are ruled out.
Schlagwörter: 
Incomplete contracts
asymmetric information
exit options
JEL: 
D82
D86
L15
ISBN: 
3938369949
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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