Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28071
Authors: 
Berger, Helge
Nitsch, Volker
Lybek, Tonny
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Freien Universität Berlin 2008/5
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards (or monetary policy committees) across countries. We discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.
Subjects: 
Committee
council
governance
decision making
monetary policy
JEL: 
E52
E58
E61
ISBN: 
3938369760
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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