Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/28023 
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dc.contributor.authorPuschke, Kerstinen
dc.date.accessioned2006-02-14-
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-25T13:28:04Z-
dc.date.available2009-09-25T13:28:04Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.isbn3938369248en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/28023-
dc.description.abstractAuthority is modelled as the right to undertake a non-contractible decision in a joint project. We show that the allocation of authority depends on bargaining power and differences in both parties cost functions. The decision-maker is assumed to exert an externality on the other parties. Overall surplus is shared according to generalized Nash bargaining. Under limited liability, the agent with the larger cost parameter receives authority if the agents' cost parameters are very different. If the agents have similar cost parameters, bargaining power determines the allocation of authority. Possible applications include the introduction of a new product.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFreie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionsbeiträge |x2005/25en
dc.subject.jelD23en
dc.subject.jelL22en
dc.subject.jelL24en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordAuthorityen
dc.subject.keywordDecision Rightsen
dc.subject.keywordIncomplete Contractsen
dc.subject.stwAutoritäten
dc.subject.stwKooperationen
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Haftungen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe allocation of authority under limited liability-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn507402189en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fubsbe:200525en

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