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dc.contributor.authorBester, Helmuten
dc.date.accessioned2006-02-14-
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-25T13:28:01Z-
dc.date.available2009-09-25T13:28:01Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.isbn3938369205en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/28019-
dc.description.abstractThis paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that impose externalities on other members of the organization. When only decision rights can be contractually assigned to one of the organization's stakeholders, the optimal assignment minimizes the resulting inefficiencies by giving control rights to the party with the highest stake in the organization's decisions. Under asymmetric information, the efficient allocation of authority depends on the communication of private information. In the case of multiple decision areas, divided control rights may enhance organizational efficiency unless there exist complementarities between different decisions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFreie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionsbeiträge |x2005/21en
dc.subject.jelD23en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelL22en
dc.subject.jelP14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordAuthorityen
dc.subject.keywordDecision Rightsen
dc.subject.keywordExternalitiesen
dc.subject.keywordIncomplete Contractsen
dc.subject.keywordImperfect Informationen
dc.subject.keywordTheory of the Firmen
dc.subject.stwTheorie der Unternehmungen
dc.subject.stwUnvollständiger Vertragen
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommene Informationen
dc.subject.stwExterner Effekten
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwEntscheidungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleExternalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn507401689en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fubsbe:200521en

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