Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/28014 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CSLE Discussion Paper No. 2008-02
Verlag: 
Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE), Saarbrücken
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper investigates the effectiveness of the new Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 which replaces the mandatory notification and authorization system by a legal exception system. Effectiveness is operationalized via the two subcriteria compliance to Art. 81 EC Treaty and the probabilities of type I and type II errors committed by the European Commission. We identify four different types of Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria: fullcompliance, zero-compliance, positive-compliance and full-deterrence. We show that the Commission can, in principle, hit the full-compliance equilibrium, where the cartelizing firms fully obey the requirements of Art 81(3) EC Treaty and both error probabilities are zero.
Schlagwörter: 
competition law
cartel law enforcement
legal exception
imperfect
JEL: 
K21
K42
L40
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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