Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/279139 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 16441
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We construct a dynamic model of child development where forward-looking parents and children jointly take actions to increase the child's cognitive and non-cognitive skills within a Markov Perfect Equilibrium framework. In addition to time and money investments in their child, parents also choose whether to use explicit incentives to increase the child's self-investment, which may reduce the child's future intrinsic motivation to invest by reducing the child's discount factor. We use the estimated model parameters to show that the use of extrinsic motivation has large costs in terms of the child's future incentives to invest in themselves.
Schlagwörter: 
time allocation
child development
parenting styles
JEL: 
J13
D1
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.77 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.