Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278926 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 16228
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Longer life expectancy can affect individuals' incentives to work, save, and marry, net of any changes in their underlying health. We test this hypothesis by using the sudden arrival of a new treatment in 1995 that dramatically increased life expectancy for HIV-infected individuals. We compare the behavioral responses of HIV-infected individuals who were still in good health but who differed in their access to the new treatment. Those with access to treatment work substantially more, marry later, but do not save more. Our results highlight the importance of accounting for such incentive effects when valuing increases in life expectancy.
Subjects: 
life expectancy
labor supply
marriage
HIV
JEL: 
D84
I12
J12
J21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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