Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278866 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 16168
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
This paper studies an information intervention designed and implemented in the context of a school assignment mechanism in Mexico City. We find that providing students from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds with feedback about their academic performance contributes to placing applicants in schools that better fit their skills, allowing them to graduate on time from high school at a higher rate. We also quantify the effect of a counterfactual and yet feasible implementation of the information intervention at a much larger scale. Simulation results demonstrate substantial heterogeneity in the demandside responses, which trigger sorting and displacement patterns within the assignment mechanism. The equilibrium effects of the intervention may possibly hinder the subsequent academic trajectories of high-achieving and socio-economically disadvantaged students.
Subjects: 
subjective expectations
information provision
school choice
upper-secondary education
scaling up experiments
spillover and equilibrium effects
JEL: 
D83
I21
I24
J24
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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