Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278737 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 407
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
To help households and firms with exploding energy costs in the aftermath of the Ukraine war, a new policy called the "energy price brake" was implemented. A unique feature of this relief measure is that it provides a transfer that increases in the consumer's contractual per-unit price of energy. In a formal model, we show that this policy creates incentives for moral hazard of energy providers to raise per-unit prices. Whereas this moral hazard problem increases the policy's fiscal costs, it also reinforces energy savings. Whether the policy's main beneficiaries are consumers or firms depends on the market structure.
Schlagwörter: 
Energy Price Policies
Energy Crisis
Energy Saving
Energy Price Brake
JEL: 
D04
L12
Q48
K33
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-406-0
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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