Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278676 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECONtribute Discussion Paper No. 252
Verlag: 
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI), Bonn and Cologne
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the effect of ambiguity on timing decisions. An agent faces a stopping problem with an uncertain stopping payoff and a stochastic time limit. The agent is unsure about the correct model quantifying the uncertainty and seeks to maximize her payoff guarantee over a set of plausible models. As time passes and the agent updates, the worst-case model used to evaluate a given strategy can change, creating a problem of dynamic inconsistency. We characterize the stopping behavior in this environment and show that, while the agent's myopic incentives are fragile to small changes in the set of considered models, the best consistent plan from which no future self has incentives to deviate is robust.
Schlagwörter: 
Stopping problem
ambiguity
consistent planning
JEL: 
C61
D81
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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