Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278511 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECONtribute Discussion Paper No. 236
Verlag: 
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI), Bonn and Cologne
Zusammenfassung: 
Autocratic regimes can use carrots and/or sticks to prevent being overthrown by protests. Carrots, i.e. resource allocation, reduce the probability of protests, but cannot help to end them. Sticks, i.e. repression, reduce the probability that protests overthrow the regime, but also decrease its popularity. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I show that residential construction and military presence increase in protest municipalities after an uprising in 1953 in former East Germany. This cannot be explained by preexisting differences, demand for housing, or external warfare considerations. Carrots were furthermore used to counteract sticks' negative effect on popularity. More construction is associated with more regime support.
Schlagwörter: 
Political Economy
autocracy
Protests
JEL: 
D72
D74
N44
P26
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
3.81 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.