Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278359 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 2783
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
What is the effect of Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) on financial stability? We answer this question by studying a model of financial intermediation with an endogenously determined probability of a bank run, using global games. As an alternative to bank deposits, consumers can also store their wealth in remunerated CBDC issued by the central bank. Consistent with widespread concerns among policymakers, higher CBDC remuneration increases the withdrawal incentives of consumers, and thus bank fragility. However, the bank optimally responds to the additional competition by offering better deposit rates to retain funding, which reduces fragility. Thus, the overall relationship between CBDC remuneration and bank fragility is U-shaped.
Schlagwörter: 
Central Bank Digital Currency
Bank Fragility
Demand Deposits
Global Games
JEL: 
D82
G01
G21
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-92-899-5525-6
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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