Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278358 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 2782
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
Loan guarantees represent a form of government intervention to support bank lending. However, their use raises concerns as to their effect on bank risk-taking incentives. In a model of financial fragility that incorporates bank capital and a bank incentive problem, we show that loan guarantees reduce depositor runs and improve bank underwriting standards, except for the most poorly capitalized banks. We highlight a novel feedback effect between banks' underwriting choices and depositors' run decisions, and show that the effect of loan guarantees on banks' incentives is different from that of other types of guarantees, such as deposit insurance.
Schlagwörter: 
panic runs
fundamental runs
bank monitoring
charter value
JEL: 
G21
G28
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-92-899-5524-9
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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