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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2301
Verlag: 
Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics, Linz
Zusammenfassung: 
We estimate the returns to more targeted disability insurance (DI) programs in terms of labor force participation, program spillovers, and worker health. To do so, we analyze workers after an acute workplace injury that experience differential levels of application screening. We find that when workers face stricter screening requirements, they are less likely to claim disability and are more likely to remain in the labor force. We observe no differences in any physical or mental health outcomes. Our findings imply that imposing stricter DI screening has large fiscal benefits but does not yield any detectable health costs, on the margin.
Schlagwörter: 
disability insurance
retirement
health
JEL: 
I38
I18
J18
J16
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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