Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278245 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers No. 22-14
Publisher: 
University of Bern, Department of Economics, Bern
Abstract: 
A consumer wants to buy one of three different products. An expert observes which of the three products is the best match for the consumer. Under linear prices a monopolistic expert may truthfully reveal, may partially reveal, and may not reveal at all her information. The outcome is inefficient; moreover, the consumer gets some of the surplus. With a two-part tariff the expert truthfully reveals her information. The outcome is efficient and the expert appropriates the entire surplus. If experts are competitive, they also truthfully reveal; here all the surplus goes to consumers.
Subjects: 
advice
credence good
horizontal product differentiation
JEL: 
D18
D82
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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