Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278108 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
I4R Discussion Paper Series No. 74
Publisher: 
Institute for Replication (I4R), s.l.
Abstract: 
Ngangoué and Schotter (2023) investigate common-probability auctions. By running an experiment, they find that, in contrast to the substantial overbidding found in common-value auctions, bidding in strategically equivalent common-probability auctions is consistent with the Nash equilibrium. We reproduce their results in R, conduct robustness checks on how their sample was constructed, and consider possible heterogeneity. We confirm their documented qualitative results.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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