Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/27734 
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dc.contributor.authorMcCannon, Bryan C.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-07-
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-02T12:15:14Z-
dc.date.available2009-09-02T12:15:14Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27734-
dc.description.abstractThe use of a taser by law enforcement can substitute for either a gun (a more-violent technology) or a mildly-violent technology (such as pepper spray or hands-on tactics). Which is used affects both the severity of harm when used and the amount of resistance, which affects how often it must be used. Thus, does the adoption of a less-violent technology lead to more or less violence? This question is addressed in an application to the adoption of tasers by law enforcement officials. A game-theoretic model is developed and environments where resistance to arrest and expected harm both increase and decrease are identified.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKielen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aEconomics Discussion Papers |x2009-36en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordLaw enforcementen
dc.subject.keywordless-violent technologyen
dc.subject.keywordstrategic offsetting behavioren
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen
dc.subject.stwGewalten
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwKriminalitätsökonomiken
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleDo less-violent technologies result in less violence? A theoretical investigation applied to the use of tasers by law enforcement-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn60625823Xen
dc.rights.licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.enen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwedp:200936en

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