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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper Series 1 No. 2009,02
Verlag: 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper investigates how multinational firms choose the capital structure of their foreign affiliates in response to political risk. We focus on two choice variables, the leverage and the ownership structure of the foreign affiliate, and we distinguish different types of political risk, such as expropriation, unreliable intellectual property rights and confiscatory taxation. In our theoretical analysis we find that, as political risk increases, the ownership share tends to decrease, whereas leverage can both increase or decrease, depending on the type of political risk. Using the Microdatabase Direct Investment of the Deutsche Bundesbank, we find supportive evidence for these different effects.
Schlagwörter: 
Multinational firms
political risk
capital structure
leverage
ownership structure
foreign affiliates
JEL: 
G32
F21
F23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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