Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27581
Authors: 
Beschorner, Patrick Frank Ernst
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 08-099
Abstract: 
Under ex ante access regulation entrants often claim that access fees are excessive. I show that this is only the case if further entry is admitted. If the entrant is protected from further entry it would agree with the incumbent upon a strictly positive access fee which may exceed the efficient level. Ex post regulation facilitates this type of collusion and should be abandoned.
Subjects: 
entry deterrence
access regulation
network infrastructure
vertical differentiation
JEL: 
K23
L42
K21
L51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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