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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal [ISSN:] 1864-6042 [Volume:] 3 [Issue:] 2009-12 [Publisher:] Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) [Place:] Kiel [Year:] 2009 [Pages:] 1-22
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
The author analyzes the optimal investment in environmental protection in a model of non-overlapping hyperbolically discounting agents. He shows that, in the long run and in the absence of a commitment device, society is stuck in a situation where all agents prefer further investments, yet no agent invests. This holds no matter whether agents are aware of the time inconsistency of their preferences. As a consequence, awareness of the time-inconsistency problem poses at best a short run remedy. Moreover, such an outcome may be Pareto inefficient and may explain the weak performance of long-run environmental policies.
Schlagwörter: 
Environmental policy
environmental protection
hyperbolic discounting
Markov perfect equilibria
time-inconsistency
JEL: 
D90
Q50
Q58
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