Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27525
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBarrett, Scotten_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-12T07:17:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-12T07:17:10Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.citation|aEconomics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal |v3 |h2009-5 |p1-12 |qdoi:10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2009-5-
dc.identifier.pidoi:10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2009-5-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27525-
dc.description.abstractThis paper explains why the approach taken so far to mitigate global climate change has failed. The central reason is an inability to enforce targets and timetables. Current proposals recommending even stricter emission limits will not help unless they are able to address the enforcement deficit. Trade restrictions are one means for doing so, but trade restrictions pose new problems, particularly if they are applied to enforce economy-wide emission limitation agreements. This paper sketches a different approach that unpacks the climate problem, addressing different gases and sectors using different instruments. It also explains how a failure to address the climate problem fundamentally will only create incentives for different kinds of responses, posing different challenges for climate change governance.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKiel-
dc.subject.jelF18en_US
dc.subject.jelF51en_US
dc.subject.jelQ54en_US
dc.subject.jelF53en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordClimate changeen_US
dc.subject.keywordKyoto protocolen_US
dc.subject.keywordenforcementen_US
dc.subject.keywordtrade restrictionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordR&Den_US
dc.subject.stwKlimaschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltabkommenen_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen_US
dc.subject.stwGlobal Governanceen_US
dc.subject.stwSanktionen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleRethinking Global Climate Change Governanceen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.ppn593804139en_US
dc.rights.licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifweej:7549-

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.