Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27509
Autoren: 
Clark, Derek J.
Sand, Jan Yngve
Datum: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Discussion Papers No. 2009-28
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyses the endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners produce complementary technology advancements, although each firm determines its R&D investment level non-cooperatively and there is no co-operation in the product market. We show that the equilibrium coalition outcome is either one between the two most efficient firms, or a coalition with all three firms. The two-firm coalition is the preferred outcome of a welfare maximising authority if ex ante marginal cost is sufficiently high, and the three-firm coalition is preferred otherwise. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium outcomes result in the lowest total R&D investment of all possible outcomes. Aircraft engine manufacturing provides a case study, and indicates the importance of anti-trust issues as an addition to the theory.
Schlagwörter: 
R&D
endogenous coalitions
asymmetric firms
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
458.77 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.