Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27388
Authors: 
Muravyev, Alexander
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
DIW Discussion Papers 865
Abstract: 
This paper uses a quasi-experimental framework provided by recent changes in Russian corporate law to study the effect of investor protection on the value of shares. The legal change analyzed involves the empowerment of preferred (non-voting) shareholders to veto unfavorable changes in their class rights. Based on a novel hand-collected dataset of dual class stock companies in Russia and using the difference-in-difference estimator, the study finds a statistically and economically significant effect of improved protection of preferred shareholders on the value of their shares. The result is robust to several changes in the empirical specification.
Subjects: 
Investor protection
company law
dual class stock
class rights
Russia
JEL: 
G30
G38
K22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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