Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/27377 
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dc.contributor.authorBilland, Pascalen
dc.contributor.authorBravard, Christopheen
dc.contributor.authorChakrabarti, Subhadipen
dc.contributor.authorSarangi, Sudiptaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29-
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T13:20:50Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T13:20:50Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27377-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolistic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that maximize social welfare under the most interesting scenario of diseconomies of scope. We find that in some situations firms may refrain from spying even if it is costless. Moreover, even though spying leads to increased product quality, there exist situations where it is detrimental to both consumer welfare and social welfare.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x854en
dc.subject.jelC70en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.jelL20en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordOligopolyen
dc.subject.keywordmultimarketen
dc.subject.keywordnetworksen
dc.subject.stwIndustriespionageen
dc.subject.stwOligopolen
dc.subject.stwBusiness Networken
dc.subject.stwKonsumentenrenteen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwLieferanten-Kunden-Beziehungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCorporate espionage-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn590255592en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp854en

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