Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/27317 
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dc.contributor.authorBaake, Pioen
dc.contributor.authorvon Schlippenbach, Vanessaen
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-09-
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T13:20:03Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T13:20:03Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27317-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the listing decisions of a retailer who may ask her suppliers to make upfront payments in order to be listed. We consider a sequential game with upfront payments being negotiated before short-term delivery contracts. We show that the retailer is more likely to use upfront payments the higher her bargaining power and the higher the number of potential suppliers. Upfront payments tend to lower the number of products offered by the retailer when the products are rather close substitutes. However, upfront payments can increase social welfare if they ameliorate inefficient listing decisions implied by short-term contracts only.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x793en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.jelL42en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordBuyer poweren
dc.subject.keywordupfront paymentsen
dc.subject.keywordretailingen
dc.subject.stwSortimenten
dc.subject.stwEinzelhandelen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungsmachten
dc.subject.stwLieferanten-Kunden-Beziehungen
dc.subject.stwKonsumgüterindustrieen
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Preispolitiken
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleUpfront payments and listing decisions-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn571535178en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp793en

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