Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/273160 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 03.2023
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
In a continuous-time setting, we study the design of a dynamic contract between a government and a private entity, wherein the latter commits to pay the government in return for the exclusive right to sell a service by operating a public facility. Private revenues are modelled as depending on the unobservable ability to seize market opportunities and on imperfectly correlated changes in consumers' preferences. We show that optimal regulation requires an appropriate combination of fixed and variable payments to the government, acting together both as an information revelation mechanism and as a risk sharing device.
Schlagwörter: 
Public-private partnerships
Public franchises
Adverse selection
Dynamic contracts
Persistent demand shocks
JEL: 
D81
D82
D86
H54
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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