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Autoren: 
Keser, Claudia
Montmarquette, Claude
Datum: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 745
Zusammenfassung: 
In a series of experimental games, each of two players may choose between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy to choose remuneration based on private effort, we frequently observe team remuneration chosen by both players. Team remuneration allows for high payoff for each player for cooperation, but at the same time provides individual incentives to take a free ride on the other player's effort. Due to significant cooperation we observe that in team remuneration participants make higher profits than in private remuneration. We also observe that, when participants are not given the option of private remuneration, they cooperate significantly less.
Schlagwörter: 
Team effort
voluntary collaboration
experimental economics
JEL: 
C72
C90
H41
J33
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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