Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/27170 
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dc.contributor.authorDubey, Pradeepen
dc.contributor.authorSondermann, Dieteren
dc.date.accessioned2008-12-10-
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T12:41:00Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T12:41:00Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27170-
dc.description.abstractWe show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x9/2008en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD41en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.jelD61en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordLimit ordersen
dc.subject.keyworddouble auctionen
dc.subject.keywordNash equilibriaen
dc.subject.keywordWalras equilibriaen
dc.subject.keywordmechanism designen
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwAllgemeines Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwMechanism Designen
dc.subject.stwOligopolen
dc.subject.stwBilaterales Monopolen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePerfect Competition in an Oligoply (including Bilateral Monopoly)-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn587681683en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:92008-

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