Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27170
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dc.contributor.authorDubey, Pradeepen_US
dc.contributor.authorSondermann, Dieteren_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-12-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T12:41:00Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T12:41:00Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27170-
dc.description.abstractWe show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aGraduate School of Economics|cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers|x2008,9en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD41en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.jelD61en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordLimit ordersen_US
dc.subject.keyworddouble auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordNash equilibriaen_US
dc.subject.keywordWalras equilibriaen_US
dc.subject.keywordmechanism designen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwAllgemeines Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwMechanism Designen_US
dc.subject.stwOligopolen_US
dc.subject.stwBilaterales Monopolen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePerfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly)en_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn587681683en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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