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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 7/2008
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stage two, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneously invest in a winner-take-all competition The game is solved theoretically and then tested by using laboratory experiments. We find three effects that determine risk taking at stage one - an effort effect, a likelihood effect and a reversed likelihood effect. For the likelihood effect, risk taking and investments are clearly in line with theory. Pairwise comparison shows that the effort effect seems to be more relevant than the reversed likelihood effect when takin risk.
Schlagwörter: 
Tournaments
Competition
Risk-Taking
JEL: 
M51
C91
D23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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