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dc.contributor.authorBudde, Jörgen
dc.contributor.authorKräkel, Matthiasen
dc.date.accessioned2008-12-10-
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T12:40:57Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T12:40:57Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27167-
dc.description.abstractSeveral empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empiri- cal puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained. Increasing risk leads to a less informative performance signal. Under limited liability; the principal may optimally react by in- creasing the weight on the signal and; hence; choosing higher-powered incentives.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x6/2008en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD86en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden
dc.subject.keywordlimited liabilityen
dc.subject.keywordrisk-incentive relationshipen
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Haftungen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen
dc.subject.stwRisikoaversionen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleLimited Liability and the Risk-Incentive Relationship-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn587680504en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:62008-

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