Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27167
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dc.contributor.authorBudde, Jörgen_US
dc.contributor.authorKräkel, Matthiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-12-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T12:40:57Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T12:40:57Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27167-
dc.description.abstractSeveral empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle ont hepositive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained. Increasing risk leads to a less informative performance signal. Under limited liability, the principal may optimally react by increasing the weight on the signal and, hence, choosing higher-powered incentives.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aGraduate School of Economics|cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers|x2008,6en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelD86en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordlimited liabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk-incentive relationshipen_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Haftungen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoaversionen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleLimited liability and the risk-incentive relationshipen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn587680504en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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