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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 5/2008
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper considers the interplay of job assignments with the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of an agent. Job assignments influence the self confidence of the agent, and thereby his intrinsic motivation. Monetary reward allow the principal to complement intrinsic motivation with extrinsic incentives. The main result is that the principal chooses an inefficient job assignment rule to enhance the agent's intrinsic motivation even though she can motivate him with monetary rewards. This shows that, in the presence of intrinsically motivated agents, it is not possible to separate job assignment decisions from incentive provision.
Schlagwörter: 
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
Job Assignments
JEL: 
D82
J31
J33
M12
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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